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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. V. BRANHAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TOM J. JACKSON and VERA M. 
JACKSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BERLIN GLOVE COMPANY, et al., 
Intervenors and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9412 
Brief of Intervenors and Respondents 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The facts stated in appellant's Brief are correct so far as 
the same are stated, but there are these additional facts which 
Respondents believe have a bearing on this controversy. 
Plaintiff and appellant sought and was granted compen-
sation for the services rendered in selling the property involved 
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in this action. Defendants, Tom J. Jackson and Vera M. Jackson, 
by their attorney stated that: 
"The defendants will stipulate the receipts from 
liquidation of the business will be assigned by him 
(Jackson) for the benefit of ~is cr~ditors who ~~e. credi-
tors of the Frontier Shop, e1ther 1n the acqms1t1on of 
the merchandise, the properties of the business in 
connection with the business." 
Thereupon the Court stated: 
"The record may show that stipulation." (Tr. 12). 
The Court then stated the stipulation of Counsel for the parties 
as he understood the same. The substance of such statement by 
the Court is as follows: 
"That the plaintiff may remain in possession of the 
goods and merchandise of the Frontier Shop and pro-
ceed to liquidate the merchandise on hand and hold the 
same in trust, subject to the payment of the necessary 
expenses of selling the same, that the surplus would 
be subject to the payment of the balance owing to the 
plaintiff and then pay the other creditors ratably." 
At the time the stipulation was made Attorney Cox rep-
resented Salt Lake Hardware Company, Strevell-Paterson Com-
pany and Acme Quality Paint Company. That defendants should 
execute a written assignment to plaintiff of the merchandise and 
fixtures owned by the Frontier Shop. So far as appears no 
written assignment was ever made. (Tr. 4-14). 
Among the terms of the agreement between plaintiff in the 
court below, appellant in this court, and the defendants in the 
court below, respondents in this court, are the following: 
"D. In the event Jacksons fail, neglect or refuse to 
comply with each and all of the covenants herein 
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made for their observance that Branham may de-
clare a breach of this agreement and go into pos-
session of said premises and property as in the 
first instance and all payments made and improve-
ments placed thereon shall become the property 
of Branham as liquidated damages for said 
breach." 
"E. In the event of any controversy relative to the 
compliance with the terms hereof the party at 
fault agrees to pay any damages suffered by the 
innocent party, including reasonable attorney fees, 
if any attorney is employed on account of such 
controversy.'' 
"F. In the event of forfeiture as provided for herein 
Jacksons agree to release to Branham, or his as-
signs, all property, leases and agreements incor-
corporated and referred to herein." (R. 15). 
At the trial Branham attempted to identify the merchan-
dise he sold to the Jacksons, but was unable to do so. He did 
identify the fixtures. (Trs. -05-148). 
ARGUMENT 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT ONE. THE 
TRANSACTION WHEREBY BRANHAM TOOK BACK 
THE MERCHANDISE AND FIXTURES WHICH HE 
THEREFORE SOLD TO JACKSONS IS SUBJECT TO 
THE LAW OF THE BULK SALES ACT. 
U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 25-2-1, in part provides: 
"It shall be the duty of every person who shall bar-
gain for or purchase any portion of a stock of goods, 
wares or merchandise in bulk otherwise than in the 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ordinary course of trade and in the regular a?d usual 
prosecution of the seller's business, or an entue stock 
of merchandise in bulk, or any portion of the property, 
furniture, fixtures or equipment or supplies of a hotel, 
restaurant, barber shop or other business used in carry-
ing on such business, otherwise than in the regular 
course of trade, before paying to the seller any. part 
of the purchase price thereof, or delivering any pro-
missory note or other evidence of indebtedness there-
fore, to demand and receive from such seller a sworn 
statement in writing as hereinafter provided of the 
names and addresses of all the creditors of the sellers, 
together with the amounts of the indebtedness due or 
owing by the seller to each of his creditors and it shall 
be the duty of the seller to furnish such statement which 
shall be verified by oath to substantially the following 
effect.'' 
There follows the form of the oath which provides that the 
creditors to be specified in the oath are: 
"Creditors holding claims due or which will become 
due for or on account of goods, wares or merchandise 
purchased upon credit or for the purchase price due or 
owing by (seller) to such creditors on account of money 
borrowed to carry on the business, which said goods, 
:fixtures, equipment or supplies appertain." 
It will be seen from the provisions of the Contract between 
Branham and the Jacksons above mentioned that the Jacksons 
were given possession of the property and the Jacksons in case 
of default were required to release to Branham, or his assigns, 
all property, leases and agreements incorporated and referred 
to herein. 
It is provided in U.C.A. 1953, 60-2-2, that title to specific 
goods passes when the parties so intend. 
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U.C.A. 1953, 60-2-3, lays down the rules that shall be 
applied in determining when title to goods passes. It is there 
provided that unless a different intention appears the title passes. 
"Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract 
to sell specified goods in a deliverable state the property 
in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is 
made and it is immaterial whether the time of payment 
or the time of delivery or both is postponed." 
The other rules there provided for ascertaining the intention 
of the parties as well as the provisions of the contract for the 
sale of the property here involved all indicate that it was the 
intention of the parties that title should pass to the Jacksons 
at the time the contract was entered into by them and Branham. 
Moreover, it will be seen from the provisions of the Bulk Sales 
Act that the required affidavit must be given when there is a 
bargain for a sale. 
Thus Branham stood in the same position with respect to 
the duty to comply with the Bulk Sales Act as other persons 
who buy goods in bulk. There is nothing in that law which 
relieves the parties from complying with its terms merely 
because Branham had theretofore owned the property here 
involved. 
Moreover, it will be seen from the terms of the Contract 
between Branham and Jackson under date of July 16, 1958, 
that in case of breach Branham was entitled to go into posses-
sion of said premises and property as in the first instance and 
all payments made and improvements placed thereon shall 
become the property of Branham as liquidated damages for 
such breach. Such language does not even purport to give Bran-
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ham any right to the merchandise that was purchased on credit 
by the Jacksons while they were in possession and operated the 
store. It will be seen that the trial court found that Branham 
was unable to identify the merchandise which he sold to the 
Jacksons. Counsel for appellant have not and cannot successfully 
attack such Finding. 
Counsel for appellant cite 24 Am. fur., page 352, Sec. 204, 
in support of the doctrine that the Bulk Sales Act should be 
given a strict construction because the same is in derogation 
of the common law. Under the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 
68-3-2, it is provided that statutes in derogation of the common 
law shall be given a liberal construction. That is the holding 
of this Court in a number of cases, among them are: 
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 Pac. 757; 
State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 423, 226 Par. 904; 
Castle v. Delta Land & Water Co., 58 Utah 137, 
197 Pac. 584. 
Counsel also cite the case of Inglewood State Bank v. Legt-
man, 275 Pac. 935, in support of his contention that the Bulk 
Sales Act has no application to the facts in this case. In our 
view that case does not aid appellant. So far as appears, plaintiff 
Bank in that case had not sold any merchandise or other property 
to defendant, and hence was not one of the parties which the 
Act was intended to protect. There was not involved in that 
case any claims of creditors of the defendant who had supplied 
him with merchandise, nor so far as appears was any merchan-
dise there involved that could not be identified as having been 
included in the sale which plaintiff had made and later sought 
to cancel under the terms of the contract of sale. 
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ANSWER TO APPELANT'S POINT TWO. THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND 
DECREEING THAT BRANHAM DID NOT HAVE A 
PREFERENCE OVER OTHER CREDITORS OF JACK-
SON. 
Under Point II of Appellant's Brief it is argued that 
because the contract of sale between plaintiff and defendants 
was recorded those who sold merchandise to defendants had 
notice of the terms of such sale. 
The law seems to be well and uniformly settled that to 
make a recorded instrument constructive no~ice it must be made 
so by statutory law. The common law does not so provide. It is 
said in 45 Am. fur., page 480, Sec. 105, that "in order to be 
effective notice to third persons it is obvious that the instrument 
recorded must be within the contemplation of the recording law 
since it is only through such laws that the record operates as 
constructive notice." Numerous cases are there cited in foot-
notes which support the text. There is nothing in o~r statutory 
law which lends support to the claim that those . who sold 
merchandise to the Jacksons are chargeable with notice that 
any merchandise so sold might be lawfully claimed ·by Bran-
ham. Indeed, if such were the law, the Bulk S;ales Act would 
be emasculated and the purchaser of a mercantile business on 
time. would find it difficult, if not impossible, to buy other 
merchandise on credit. . 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT THREE THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FOLLOW. THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF COUN;. 
SEL FOR RESPONDENTS AND INTERVENORS. 
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Under Point III of Appellant's Brief it is argued that the 
Court was bound to give effect to the stipulation of Respondents. 
to the effect that appellant Branham may first deduct and retain 
from the receipts received from the sale of the merchandise 
here involved the amount owing to him and then divide the 
remainder ratably among the other creditors of the Jacksons. 
The only creditors at the time the alleged stipulation was made 
that were represented by Attorney Cox were: Salt Lake Hard-
ware Company, Strevell-Paterson and Acme Quality Paint Com-
pany. (Tr. 4). Obviously Attorney Cox had no authority to 
enter into a binding stipulation on behalf of parties that he 
might thereafter represent. Moreover, the law is well and uni-
formly settled that an attorney in the absence of express 
authority is without authority to give away the rights of his 
clients. The law in such particular is thus stated in 5 Am. fur., 
300, Sec. 70: 
"It is a general principle that an attorney cannot by 
virtue of his general authority as attorney bind his client 
by any act which amounts to a surrender or waiver in 
whole or in part of any substantial right of the client 
or do any act which will either release his client's debtor 
or his surety or substantially jeopardize his interests 
in any way." 
To the same effect is the law announced in 7 C.J.S. 879. 
Among the numerous cases cited to the foregoing texts is Jones, 
et al. v. Noble, et al., 39 Pac. (2d) 486, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 316. 
Under the facts disclosed by the evidence, the Findings of 
Fact and Judgment in this case, the alleged Stipulation is with-
out legal effect because appellant gave no consideration for the 
stipulation. It is suggested by appellant that he undertook to 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and did oversee the sale of the merchandise. That is true, but 
he asked to be paid for such service and the Court granted him 
a preferred claim for all that he claimed leaving no considera-
tion to support the benefits he seeks on account of the alleged 
Stipulation. 
ANSWER TO POINT FOUR OF APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF. 
The intervenors and respondents join with appellant in the 
claim that the Court below erred in Finding and Decreeing 
that Thorley Faussett and the Bank of St. George are entitled 
to share with the other creditors of Jackson in the fund here 
involved. 
As to the claim of the Bank, we direct the attention of the 
Court to the provision of the Bulk Sales Act, U.C.A, 1953, 
25-2-1, which provides for those who are to be mentioned in 
the affidavit as being those from whom money has been bor-
rowed to carry on the business. There is no evidence that the 
Bank of St. George loaned any money to the Jacksons to carry . 
on tlie business in which they were engaged. 
CROSS APPEAL 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 74(b), the respondents 
represented by Counsel who represent respondent, Berlin Glove 
Company, et al., cross appeal from that part of the Judgment 
wherein and whereby the sum of $350.00 is allowed as attorney 
fees paid out of the fund derived from the sale of the merchan-
dise here involved, and also from that part of the Judgment 
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awarding to appellant the sum of $911.00 as a preferred claim 
for the fixtures sold out of such fund. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT A 
Appellant basis his claim for attorney fees with which to 
pay his attorney on the provisions of his Contract with the 
defendant Jacksons, which provides that if a party to the con-
tract is in default in complying with the Contract, he shall be 
liable for damages, including a reasonable attorney fee, if an 
attorney is employed on account of such controversy. (R. 15). 
So far as appears no legal services were necessary or were per-
formed in the process of selling the property. The legal services 
having been performed solely for the benefit of appellant, there 
is no basis for, in effect, requiring defendant to pay for any part 
of such service. There is no provision in the Bulk Sales Act 
which permits one creditor to recover an attorney fee to be paid 
out of the fund derived from the sale of the property, and cer-
tainly there is nothing in the Act which gives an attorney a 
preferred claim, a part of which is to be paid by a creditor who 
has not agreed to pay an attorney fee. 
The Act provides that one who bargains for or purchases 
merchandise in bulk must cause the purchase money to be ap-
plied ratably, except as provided by law, to the payment of 
claims for merchandise, furniture and fixtures on credit, and 
for money borrowed to carry on the business. If the numerous 
creditors of a failing business should hold a note or other agree-
ment for the payment of an attorney fee in the event an account 
is placed with an attorney for collection, it may be that all of 
10 
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the assets would be consumed in the payment of attorney's fees 
and nothing would be left to pay creditors. The basis for 
liability to pay an attorney fee is either because of a contract 
or by provisions of law. The respondents here have not agreed 
to contribute to the payment of an attorney fee to Counsel for 
plaintiff, and the Bulk Sales Act contains no such provision. 
Branham is a mere creditor of the Jacksons the same as the other 
creditors. Branham, the same as the intervenors, at one time 
owned property which they sold on credit to the Jacksons. That 
the Court erred in granting an attorney fee payable out of the 
fees here involved see Fidelity and Co. v. Monroe, 133 Md. 
270, 105 A 174. 
POINT B 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
APPELLANT A PREFERRED CLAIM IN THE SUM 
OF $911.00 ON ACCOUNT OF THE FURNITURE OR 
FIXTURES WHICH HE HAD THERETOFORE OWNED 
AND SOLD TO DEFENDANTS JACKSONS. 
At the trial of this cause plaintiff proceeded upon the 
theory that he had a right to all of the property that he had 
theretofore owned and conveyed to the Jacksons and sufficient 
of the property that the Jacksons had purchased on credit to 
pay him in full, including what he owed his attorney. Appar-
ently the trial court adopted such view, but denied Branham 
a claim to the merchandise because he was unable to identify 
that portion thereof which he had theretofore owned. It is the 
contention of these respondents that the Court erred in award-
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There is no language in the Bulk Sales Act which grants 
to a creditor of a seller of an entire stock of goods any preferred 
claim to that part of a stock of goods that he may be able to 
identify as being the goods which he sold. Indeed, if such a 
construction were placed on the Act, it would lead to endless 
taking of evidence and in the end often lead to a mere guess 
as to who formerly owned the various pieces of property. The 
express provision of the Act is that the fund derived from the 
sale of the property subject to the Bulk Sales Act shall be 
divided ratably, except as to those claims preferred by law. 
There is nothing in the Act which provides that fixtures used 
in the operation of a mercantile store are to be excluded from 
the Act or that the proceeds from the sale of fixtures used in 
operation of a mercantile store are to be treated as a preferred 
claim. 
The attention of the Court is again called to those provi-
sions of the Act which provide that every person who shall 
bargain for or purchase any portion of a stock of goods, wares 
or merchandise in bulk or any portion of the property, fixtures, 
equipment or supplies of a hotel, restaurant, barber shop or 
other business used in carrying on such business. 
We are mindful of the rule that when special language 
is used to describe property followed by general language, such 
general language is limited in its application to property similar 
to that described. The form of the affidavit shows that such 
rule has no application here, in that, the affidavit makes no dis-
tinction between money owing for merchandise, :fixtures, equip-
ment, service performed and money borrowed to carry on the 
business. The furniture and fixtures were as much a part of the 
12 
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business as was the merchandise. It was sold by Branham to 
the Jacksons on credit and taken back by Branham and sold 
the same as was the merchandise. That being so, Branham is 
not entitled to a preferred claim for the value of the fixtures. 
Such is the holding in the case of N. Sakelos and Co. v. Hutchin-
son Bros. 129 Md. 300, 99 A 357, Berger v. Berger, 271 Wis. 
292; 73 N.W. 2nd 94; Parkham v. Thompson Co., 127 Ga. 306 
56 SE 460. 
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